In order to detect the attacks to decision-making variable, this paper presents a data flow behavior constraint model for branch decision-ma king variables. Our model is expanded from the co mmon control flow model, it emphasizes on the analysis and verification about the data flo w for decision-making variab les, so that to ensure the branch statement can execute correctly and can also detect the attack to branch decision-making variab le easily. The constraints of our model include the collect ion of variables, the statements that the decision-making variables are dependent on and the data flow constraint with the use-def relat ion of these variables. Our experimental results indicate that it is effective in detecting the attacks to branch decision-making variables as well as the attacks to control-data.
Introduction
According to the TCG specification, the trust of an entity is based on its behavior's trust. Software's trust can be measured by its behavior when it is executing [1] . Taking trust measurement to program dynamically is hard. To date, there have been many related researches focusing on how to describe the software's behavior. These researches main ly established of software control flow behavior models based on control flow model through the static analysis or dynamic learn ing [2] [3] . There are two kinds of control flo w behavior models at present including system call-based model and function call-based model. Control-flow behavior model has been proven that it can effect ively detect co mmon attack types, such as malicious code injection attacks and return-to-libc attacks, .etc.
The behavioral models based on the traditional control-flow can effectively detect the attacks of the controldata. Nevertheless, since the control-flo w behavior model only concerns about the integrity of control-data, it doesn't inspect the data flow information of program, therefo re, when an attacker tampers with other noncontrol-data, it may change the software control flow without corrupting the control-data, hence, the tradit ional control-flo w behavior model can not detect such kind of attack wh ich is relatively a co mmon sort of threat [4] . Among them, the control-data refers to control flow related data of the software, for examp le, return addresses of function call, function pointers, etc.. On the other hand, non-control-data includes configuration data, user data, decision-making data (the variab les referenced by the branch statement) and so on. This paper proposes a data flow behavior constraint model for branch decision-making variables and it can be used to verify program's behavior while running. Our model made some imp rovements for the common control-flo w behavior model by mainly increased the study on the relationship of data flow of decision-making variable. The contribution of this paper includes: (1) our model can detect the branch statements related behavior which depends on the values of decision-making variables; (2) our model can extract constraint of data flow behavior wh ich is relevant with decision-making variables of branch statements; (3) our model can detect whether it meet the constraints of data flow as well as verify ing the relation of function calls during running time, so it can guarantee the correctness of the decision-making variables and authenticate the behavior of branch statements. When an error happens during the function call or an abnormal data flow occurs, the system will g ive an alarm.
A Data Flow Behavior Constraints Model for Branch Decision-making Variables

Branch-Reserving Call Graph
Generally speaking, a software behavior model should be composed of two parts including the function calls relations and branch statement of decision-making variables for the constraints of data flow behavior. The former is not the focus of this paper, we main ly illustrate the latter.
Consructing BRCG
The function call is regarded as the behavior granularity for control flow behavior in this paper, therefore we only take into consideration the branch statements which have control dependence relations with function call statements and function return statements. The control dependence means if the execution of the statement S1 is decided by the execution state of the statement S2, then we say S1 depends on S2.
In order to extract branch statements that the function calls depend on, we adopt procedure structure model which is proposed in [5] . It added the informat ion of branch statements into the function call graph and fo rmed a graph called Branch-Reserving Call Graph, denoted by BRCG. The b rief definit ion of the BRCG is described as follows:
BRCG is defined as a triple <N, S, B>, among them, 1) N is a set, its element includes functions-call statements and branch-call statements.
2) S is a set of sequential relat ions, where for 2 2 < > , and
3) B is a set of branching relations, where for 2 2 < > , and
for < > and ,
n , n B ∉ and for < > and , Due to the function call and function return are two important control flow behaviors, it is necessary to add the function returns related information into the definition of BRCG. In this way, BRCG can describe the branch statements which function return would depend on, as shown in the Fig. 1(the gray part) .
N in the BRCG is defined as follo ws: N is a set, its elements are co mposed of function call statement, branch statements and function return statements. The others use the definition of [5] .
Pruning BRCG
Because there may be lots of informat ion about branch statements in BRCG, it will take large overheads to create verificat ion model on the basis of BRCG. Therefore, it is necessary to prune appropriately for BRCG. For minimizing false negative, this paper takes the following conservative strategy: prune the sub-graphs of basic function only.
For the well-designed software, each component plays a different ro le in the system. On the basic level, functions only finish the low-level and relatively simple functions, such as to control equipments running, and achieve basic operations of data structures such as stack, queue .etc as well as achieve basic system functions such as writing log. Reference [6] named this kind of function utility routines. Functions, which are on the higher-level, take advantage of this mechanis m provided by basic functions to achieve complicated system functions with certain strategy.
The purpose of tampering with the decision-making variab les of b ranch is to bypass security checking or logic checking so as to acquire functions of software. Utility routines are merely achieved details of low-level, they do not involve decision and judgment of logic, business or security of higher-level. Therefore, the branch actions of utility routines could be not involved in the scope of dynamic verification. Based on that, our strategy of pruning is to prune the sub-graphs of utility routines in BRCG.
Reference [6] indicates us an important feature that any utility routines called many times in the different position of software code may have higher fan-in value, so we can identify utility routines by calculating their fan-in. We adopt the following calculation given in [6] 
Behavi or Constraint of Data Fl ow Associated With the Branch Decision-Making Variables
Since the behavior of branch statements depends on the value of decision-making variables and attackers may change the behavior of branch statements by tampering the value of decision-making variab les, if the decision-making variables can be found firstly and make appropriate protection for them, the behavior of branch statements may be verified and the violat ion may be forbidden.
Generally, the corruption of variables occurs when a statement illegit imately modifies the data in memory address which is out of its writable ranges. According to the definit ion given in [7] , supposing valuable v is defined in statement dst and referenced in statement ust, moreover, v is not redefined between dst and ust, then ust is data flow dependent on dst, this is called use-def relation and denoted by ( ) v ust,dst . Therefore, detecting whether data flow during running time is conformed with use-def relation or not can dynamic detect the occurence about corruption of the decision-making variables.
On the other hand, because there is dependence relation between variables, only detecting the decisionmaking variab les is insufficient. As for c=a+b, supposing c is a decision-making variables, then c wou ld be indirectly influenced by tampering a or b, thus, it is necessary to detect variables which are direct ly or indirectly depended by decision-making variab les. Using program slicing techniques could ext ract variables and statement set which are depended by decision-making variables. Program slicing set is a subset of program statements, contains statements depended by variables at a program point directly or indirect ly [8] , the dependence includes control dependence and data dependence. In this paper, the control dependence will be omitted, we only ext ract data dependence statement, then further extract variables depended by decisionmaking variables.
For the branch reserved calling graph of a software G<N,S,B>, G′<N′,S′,B′> is its corresponding graph after pruning. Supposing the set of all branch statement in During running time, dynamic instrumentation technology can be used to achieve the dynamic verification. The detail is omitted since space is limited.
Security Anal ysis of this Model
The authentication function of SSH server is used to illustrate the effectiveness of our model. Ignoring some detailed parts, some piece of SSH code is shown in Fig. 3 . return; } } Fig 3 . some code of do_authentication() SSH server certifies connection by function do_authentication(). This function can certify remote login user by infin ite loop of mu ltip le user authentication mechanis ms. If remote users could pass one of mechanisms, the certification succeeds. Local variable authenticated is used for marking whether the certification passes authentication or not. This function receives user input further in statement 3th and calls function detect_attack(). Since function detect_attack() exists integer overflow vulnerability and the vulnerability could be triggered as soon as a set of data that is specifically designed is inputted on remote node, so that the remote users can modify any data of memory address easily to revalue variab le authenticated to 1 to break the loop, and bypass the authentication mechanis m.
A Data Flow Behavior Constraints Model for Branch Decision-making Variables
The fan-in value of function do_authentication() is 1,and statement 9th is its return statement, so both statement 8th and 9th should be included in BRCG that have been pruned. The data flow constraints of decision-making variab le of b ranch statement 8th would be into the range of verification. If variab le authenticated is modified during detect_attack() running, as authenticated variable does not belong to the set of writable variables, the trusted status of variable authenticated would be set to untrusted. While branch statement 8th is being executed, we are able to check the variables referenced by the statement 8th to discover abnormal actions of a process.
Concluding Re marks
We described a new model for detecting software problems at run time by analyzing and verifying the data flow for decision-making variables. Our model can be effective in detecting the attacks to branch decisionmaking variables as well as the attacks to control-data. While our work is still at an early stage and it incurs much overhead, we intend to expand and optimize our method to include the analysis of additional parameters and rules that define their relations. In our future works, we will further enhance the practicality of the expected behavior model.
